Booms, Busts and the Governance of the Eurozone by De Grauwe, P & Ji, Y
160
160
 7 
 Booms, Busts and the Governance of the Eurozone 
 Paul  De Grauwe and  Yuemei   Ji 
 7.1  Introduction 
 Since the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, substantial 
efforts have been made to create a new form of governance for the Eurozone 
that will make the Monetary Union more robust in absorbing future eco-
nomic and fi nancial shocks. Much of the drive to adapt the governance of the 
Eurozone has been infl uenced by the traditional theory of  optimal currency 
areas (OCA), which stresses the need for fl exibility in product and labour 
markets .  As a result, the Eurozone countries have been pushed towards struc-
tural reforms that aim to reduce the structural rigidities in product and labour 
markets, in the hope that this would lead to a more resilient monetary union 
capable of withstanding future asymmetric shocks. 
 Figure 7.1 , which presents the OECD product market legislation index, 
shows that the Eurozone countries have introduced structural reforms at a 
faster pace than the rest of the OECD countries.  Figure 7.2 , which presents 
the OECD index of employment protection, shows how the Eurozone has 
signifi cantly reduced its tight employment protection, especially since the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010. It is interesting to note that since the early 1990s 
the non- Eurozone OECD countries have followed a reverse trend of increas-
ing employment protection. In this chapter, we ask whether this movement 
towards structural reform as part of the push for new governance is going in the 
right direction. We will argue that this is not the case. The main reason is that 
the nature of the shocks that have hit the Eurozone does not correspond to 
the pattern of asymmetric shocks that has been identifi ed by the OCA theory 
to require more fl exibility. We will argue that what is needed in the Eurozone 
   We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions from Daniel Gros, André Sapir, 
Frank Vandenbroucke. 
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 Figure 7.1:  Product market legislation index. 
 Source: OECD. 
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 Figure 7.2:  Employment protection legislation index. 
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is not more structural reforms but a better mechanism capable of dealing with 
the classical boom and bust dynamics that are inherent to capitalism . 
 Hyman Minsky’s classic analysis of booms and busts in capitalist systems 
stresses the need to stabilise using government mechanisms. 1  We will ask 
whether the Eurozone, which has moved towards more fl exibility, provides for 
this stabilising mechanism.In  Sections 7.2 and  7.3 , we analyse what the OCA 
theory has to say about the need for fl exibility and stabilisation in the face of 
asymmetric shocks. In  Sections 7.4 and  7.5 we analyse empirically the nature 
of these shocks in the Eurozone and in  Sections 7.6 and  7.7 we study what 
this evidence might means for the governance of the Eurozone. We conclude 
in  Section 7.8 . 
 7.2  Standard OCA Theory and the  
Governance of the Eurozone 
 The theory of OCA has created a set of ideas that has a signifi cant infl uence 
on the governance of the Eurozone and on views about how this governance 
should be strengthened in the future. The best way to make this clear is to 
present the core of the OCA theory, using a well- known graphical representa-
tion of this theory. 2  This is done in  Figure 7.3 . On the horizontal axis we set 
 1   H.  Minsky ,  Stabilizing an Unstable Economy ( Yale University Press ,  1986 ) . 
 2   See  P.  De Grauwe ,  Economics of Monetary Union ( Oxford University Press , 11th edn,  2016 ) . 
OCAs
Symmetry
Flexibility
 Figure 7.3:  OCA theory trade- off between symmetry and fl exibility. 
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out the degree of fl exibility in the labour and goods markets. This measures 
the degree to which wages and prices adjust freely to shocks and the degree 
to which workers are mobile. We assume that these different dimensions of 
fl exibility can be represented by one index. On the vertical axis we set out the 
degree of symmetry between countries, that is the degree of co- movement 
(correlation) of macroeconomic variables such as output and employment. 
Thus, when there are a lot of asymmetric shocks we move downwards along 
the vertical axis. By contrast, when shocks become less asymmetric we move 
upwards along the vertical axis. The downward sloping OCA line represents 
the trade- off between symmetry and fl exibility. Hence, when the degree of 
symmetry declines (there are more asymmetric shocks) countries in a mone-
tary union need more fl exibility to deal with these shocks. The OCA- line sep-
arates the space into two zones. The OCA- zone above the OCA- line contains 
the collection of points at which symmetry and fl exibility are high enough to 
guarantee that the benefi ts of the monetary union exceed the costs. The points 
below the OCA- line are the points at which symmetry and fl exibility are too 
low, meaning that countries located in that zone will fi nd that the costs of the 
monetary union exceed the benefi ts. The OCA- line that separates the two 
zones can therefore also be defi ned as the collection of points for which the 
benefi ts and the costs of the monetary union are equal. 
 This theory has been very infl uential for the governance of the Eurozone 
and continues to be so. It is at the core of the policy prescriptions that call for 
structural reforms so as to make the labour and goods markets more fl exible. 
 In fact, since the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 member countries 
have been pressured by the European Commission to introduce a whole set 
of structural reforms. The member countries that turned to the Eurozone for 
fi nancial support (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) were given this support con-
ditional on introducing a series of structural reforms that would make labour 
and goods markets more fl exible. The underlying rationale was the OCA the-
ory that stresses the need for fl exibility to deal with asymmetric shocks in a 
monetary union . 
 One of the underlying assumptions of this theory and its prescription for 
fl exibility is that the asymmetric shocks are permanent. When shocks are per-
manent, such as a change in preferences that leads consumers in one coun-
try to buy more of the foreign than of the domestic good, or a productivity 
increase in one but not in another country, then there is really no other way in 
a monetary union to deal with such a shock other than changing relative prices 
(wages or product prices) or by a movement of labour and capital. Things are 
very different, however, when shocks are temporary. In that case, it can be 
argued that fl exibility is not necessary. In fact it can even be harmful.  Take 
the case of business- cycle movements. When these are asymmetric, in other 
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words when they are not synchronised, it makes little sense to adjust by rela-
tive price changes and/ or by movements of labour and capital. Flexibility may 
in fact exacerbate the business- cycle movements and its asymmetry. For exam-
ple, if country A experiences a recession and country B a boom the movement 
of labour from A to B is likely to exacerbate the recession in country A and 
the boom in country B. Or take fl exibility of wages. If during the recession 
country A is forced to reduce wages, the immediate effect of the wage cuts will 
be a decline in aggregate demand, which will make the recession in country 
A more severe. From the preceding analysis it follows that temporary shocks, 
such as business- cycle movements, should be dealt with differently: by stabili-
sation efforts that smooth consumption over time. 
 However, the OCA theory that focuses on the trade- off between fl exibility 
and symmetry was developed on the assumption that asymmetric shocks are 
permanent. These shocks are also typically exogenous, like meteor impacts. 
There is nothing one can do about these. One is forced to adjust by making 
the system more fl exible. Business- cycle shocks, by contrast, can be said to 
be endogenous. They are the result of endogenous movements in optimism 
and pessimism that lead to booms and busts. These movements have been 
endemic in capitalism and will continue to do their work also in a monetary 
union. They have been described by Minsky and Kindleberger. 3  To the extent 
that these movements are not synchronised, they do not call for more fl exi-
bility; rather they call for insurance mechanisms that allow countries experi-
encing a downturn to be compensated by countries that experience a boom, 
in such a way that when the fortunes of countries are reversed the transfers 
are reversed. It has long been recognised that such an insurance mechanism 
requires some form of budgetary union. Thus, endogenous and asymmetric 
business- cycle movements call for very different institutions in the union from 
the permanent and exogenous shocks that have been at the core of the OCA 
analysis . 
 7.3  Governance of a Monetary Union in  
the Face of Temporary Shocks 
 In this section we consider what the nature of the institutions of a monetary 
union should be when the shocks are endogenous, temporary, and asymmet-
ric. We will focus on business- cycle movements that are driven by ‘animal spir-
its’, that is to say, movements of optimism and pessimism that lead to booms 
 3   Minsky, n.  1 in this chapter;  C.  Kindleberger ,  Manias, Panics and Crashes. A  History of 
Financial Crises ( John Wiley & Sons , 4th edition,  2001 ) . 
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during periods of optimism and recessions during periods of pessimism. In 
this section we focus on the theory. In the next section we analyse the empir-
ical question of the nature of the asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone. We 
start from a similar trade- off to the one in  Figure 7.3 , but now we concen-
trate on the trade- off between fl exibility and budgetary union. We defi ne a 
budgetary union as a (partial) transfer of the national power to tax and to 
spend to European institutions. A budgetary union has the effect of creating 
an insurance mechanism that allows countries experiencing bad economic 
times to be compensated by countries that fare well. The way this trade- off 
is constructed is as follows ( Figure 7.4 ). On the vertical axis we set out the 
degree of budgetary union. The higher the degree of budgetary union the 
more we move upwards along the vertical line. On the horizontal axis we set 
out the same measure of fl exibility as that used in  Figure 7.3 . The OCAs line 
now measures the minimum combinations of budgetary union and fl exibility 
needed to make a monetary union economically attractive (higher benefi ts 
than costs). It is negatively sloped for the following reason. When budgetary 
union increases, insurance against asymmetric shocks increases, making mon-
etary union less costly. As a result, there is less need for fl exibility. We move 
upward along the negatively sloped OCAs line. 4  
 4   We call this trade- off the OCAs line because the idea of such a trade- off comes from André 
Sapir, see A. Sapir, ‘Architecture Reform for an Heterogeneous EMU: National vs. European 
OCAs
Budgetary union
Flexibility
 Figure 7.4:  Trade- off between budgetary union and fl exibility. 
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 This is an important insight. Flexibility may sound great for many econo-
mists and central bankers, but it is costly for those people who are forced to 
be fl exible. Flexibility means that these people may have to accept a wage cut 
or be forced to emigrate. We learn from  Figure 7.4 that a movement towards 
budgetary union alleviates the (painful) need to be fl exible. It may also make 
a monetary union more acceptable to large segments of the population. At 
the same time, however, it may make those who are asked to transfer revenue 
unhappy, resisting such a ‘Transfer Union’. 
 We can use the insights of  Figure 7.4 to analyse the importance of the nature 
of the asymmetric shocks. We have made the distinction between asymmetric 
shocks that are exogenous and permanent, and asymmetric shocks that are 
temporary and endogenous. We have argued that when a permanent (exog-
enous) shock occurs, fl exibility is the only option to adjust to this shock. By 
contrast, when business- cycle movements are synchronised it is not optimal to 
use fl exibility. In that case an insurance mechanism is the appropriate way to 
govern the monetary union. A budgetary union provides this. 
 It can now be shown that the nature of the shocks infl uences the slope of 
the trade- off. 5  When the shocks are mainly of the permanent type, we obtain 
a steep trade- off. We show this in  Figure 7.5 . We have also put the Eurozone 
of 19 members below the OCA S - line, suggesting that the present Eurozone 
is not an OCA. The steep trade- off implies that a small increase in fl exibility 
leads us more quickly into the OCA zone than a budgetary union. In the 
most extreme case – when all shocks are of a permanent nature – the trade- off 
becomes vertical. In that case no amount of budgetary union will bring us into 
the OCA- zone. There is then no other way but to increase fl exibility. 
 Things are very different when the shocks are temporary, driven by business- 
cycle movements. In that case the trade- off is fl at ( Figure 7.6 ). As a result, 
much fl exibility is needed to move the Eurozone into the OCA area com-
pared to budgetary union. A relatively small increase in budgetary union will 
bring us into the OCA- zone. In the most extreme case – when all shocks are 
of a temporary nature – the trade- off is horizontal. In that case no amount of 
fl exibility will succeed in bringing the Eurozone into the OCA- zone. The 
only way to achieve optimality will be through a budgetary union . 
 One complication that arises here has to do with hysteresis. Sometimes 
temporary shocks can lead to hysteresis effects. For example, a recession typi-
cally leads to plant closures and dismissal of workers. To the extent that these 
Institutions’, contribution to the conference ‘Adjustment in European Economies in the 
Wake of the Economic Crisis’, Bank of Portugal, 9 May 2015. 
 5   We are grateful to Frank Vandenbroucke for suggesting that the nature of the shocks affects the 
slope of the trade- off. 
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workers have developed fi rm specifi c skills that are lost when the fi rm dis-
appears, the workers lose part of their human capital making it diffi cult to 
fi nd another (comparable) job. Unemployment can then become protracted. 
Another example relates to the nature of the boom. If, as was the case in 
OCAs
Eurozone
Budgetary union
Flexibility
 Figure  7.5:  How to move the Eurozone towards the OCA S - area when perma-
nent shocks dominate? 
OCAs
Eurozone
Budgetary union
Flexibility
 Figure 7.6:  How to move the Eurozone towards the OCA S - area when business- 
cycle movements dominate? 
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Ireland and Spain, the boom is concentrated in the housing market, many 
workers are attracted to this sector during the boom. After the crash they are 
dismissed. They may fi nd it diffi cult to use their skills acquired in the housing 
market in other sectors of the economy. There is a large literature on sources 
of hysteresis. 6  
 The existence of hysteresis has implications for our discussion. It implies 
that if a business- cycle shock occurs it matters a great deal to try to use stabili-
sation so as to avoid hysteresis effects. If temporary business- cycle shocks have 
permanent effects the need to set up schemes that will mitigate the impact 
of these shocks becomes even more important.  Figures 7.5 and  7.6 lead to 
another interesting insight. Flexibility in labour markets is something national 
governments can do. There is no need for further integration to increase fl ex-
ibility. Budgetary union, however, is of a different nature. It requires political 
integration. In other words, while fl exibility is in the realm of national govern-
ments, budgetary union is a European affair. 7  When shocks are permanent 
they have to be dealt with at the national level while when shocks are tempo-
rary the response should be at the level of the Eurozone . 
 7.4  The Nature of Shocks in the Eurozone:  
Empirical Evidence 
 It is not always easy to separate permanent from temporary shocks in eco-
nomic time series.  Here we use a Hodrick- Prescott fi lter (HP) that allows 
us to estimate the long- term trend component in GDP. The cyclical com-
ponent is obtained by subtracting the trend component from the observed 
GDP (for more detail, see the appendix to this chapter ( Section 7.9 ), where 
we also analyse the robustness of the results for changes in the smoothness 
parameter lambda in the HP fi lter). 8  The results of this exercise are shown 
in  Figure 7.7 . We present, for each Eurozone country, trend growth and the 
 6   See  O.J.  Blanchard and  H.L.  Summers , ‘ Hysteresis and the European Unemployment 
Problem ’ ( 1986 )  1  NBER Macroeconomics Annual  15 ; L.M. Ball, ‘Hysteresis in Unemployment: 
Old and New Evidence’ (2009),  US National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working 
Paper , 14818; A. Fatas and L. Summers, ‘The Permanent Effects of Fiscal Consolidations’ 
(2015) available at: voxeu.org/ sites/ default/ fi les/ fi le/ DP10902.pdf (accessed 19 October 2016). 
 7   Sapir, n. 4 in this chapter. 
 8   There is a literature based on Blanchard and Quah ( O.  Blanchard and  D.  Quah , ‘ The 
Dynamic Effect of Demand and Supply Disturbances ’ ( 1989 )  79  American Economic Review 
 655 ) , which is based on estimating a VAR and, after imposing identifying restrictions, is able to 
estimate the temporary and the permanent component in output shocks. We discuss this litera-
ture in  P.  De Grauwe and  Y.  Ji , ‘ Crisis Management and Economic Growth in the Eurozone ’, 
in  F.  Caselli , M.  Centeno , and  J.  Tavares (eds),  After the Crisis: Reform, Recovery and Growth 
in Europe ( Oxford University Press ,  2016) . 
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Figure 7.7:  Cyclical and trend components in GDP growth (1999– 
2014): (a) Austria; (b) Belgium; (c) Finland; (d) France; (e) Germany; (f) Greece; 
(g) Ireland; (h) Italy; (i) Netherlands; (j) Portugal; (k) Spain. 
Sources: Eurostat and own calculations.
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observed growth rates (the cyclical component is obtained by subtracting the 
observed from the trend growth). 9  Two results stand out. First, we observe 
for all Eurozone countries (except for Germany) a decline in the long- term 
growth rate of GDP. This decline is particularly signifi cant in Greece, Ireland, 
Finland, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. Second, there is great variability in the 
business- cycle (temporary) component of GDP growth. In order to gauge the 
relative importance of cyclical and trend components in GDP growth we com-
pare the mean (absolute) cyclical growth of GDP with the (absolute) mean 
trend growth of GDP for each country. 10  We show the results in  Table 7.1 . 
We observe that for the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) the cyclical growth and trend growth components are of similar 
magnitudes, although the cyclical component is systematically larger than the 
trend component. In the countries of the periphery (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, and Greece) this is very different. We observe that for these countries the 
cyclical growth component is much larger than the trend growth component 
(the most extreme case being observed for Greece). Thus, in the peripheral 
  9   We only include the original Eurozone countries. The new Eurozone countries entered too 
late to provide a suffi ciently long time series. 
 10   As the cyclical component alternates between positive and negative numbers we have to take 
the absolute values. 
 Table 7.1:  Mean (absolute) trend growth and mean (absolute) business- cycle 
change in GDP (as a percentage) during 1999– 2014 
Mean cycle Mean trend Ratio
Austria 1.79% 1.77% 1.01
Belgium 1.72% 1.67% 1.03
Germany 1.55% 1.23% 1.26
France 2.15% 1.49% 1.44
Netherlands 2.66% 1.66% 1.60
Finland 4.35% 2.02% 2.15
Spain 4.58% 2.07% 2.21
Ireland 8.01% 3.35% 2.39
Portugal 3.67% 0.81% 4.53
Italy 2.86% 0.41% 7.05
Greece 9.09% 0.90% 10.11
 Notes : (as a percentage) during 1999– 2014. 
 Source: Computations based on data from Eurostat. 
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countries the GDP growth rates have been dominated by cyclical movements 
in economic activity of the boom– bust type. 
 What are the implications of these results? First, since the start of the 
Eurozone, cyclical (temporary) movements have been the dominant factor 
behind growth variations in GDP. This is especially the case in those periph-
eral countries where cyclical movements in economic growth are many times 
higher than the long- term growth rates. Thus, as mentioned earlier, booms 
and bust in economic activity seem to be the overwhelming characteristic of 
movements in GDP in the countries of the periphery. 
 Second, it appears that the cyclical movements of GDP are highly corre-
lated in the Eurozone. This is made clear by  Table 7.2 , which shows the cor-
relations in the cyclical components of GDP growth across the Eurozone. We 
observe high correlation coeffi cients of bilateral cyclical components of GDP 
growth, typically 0.8 or more. 11  It is interesting to note that the country with the 
lowest correlation coeffi cients is Germany (although the German correlation 
coeffi cients are all positive). Thus, one can conclude that the business cycles 
of the Eurozone countries were highly correlated. Germany stands out as the 
country with the lowest (positive) correlations of its business cycle with the 
rest of the Eurozone. 
 Table 7.2:  Correlation coeffi cients of cyclical components of GDP growth 
Aus. Bel. Fin. Fra. Ger. Gre. Ire. Ita. Net. Por.
Austria
Belgium 0.9
Finland 0.9 0.9
France 0.9 0.9 0.9
Germany 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
Greece 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.0
Ireland 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.8
Italy 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.9
Netherlands 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Portugal 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
Spain 0.8 0.9 0.94 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9
 Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
  11   We study a behavioural macroeconomic model and show that in such a model ‘animal spirits’ 
can easily get correlated internationally, producing high correlations of business cycles. This 
study can be found in P. De Grauwe and Y. Ji, ‘The International Synchronisation of Business 
Cycles: The Role of Animal Spirits’ (2017) 28  Open Economies Review 1. 
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 Thus, the asymmetry between the Eurozone countries is to be found not so 
much in a lack of correlation in business- cycle movements but in the  inten-
sity of the boom– bust dynamics of growth rates. Put differently, Eurozone 
countries’ business cycles seem to have been relatively well correlated. The 
difference between these countries was that some (mainly in the periphery) 
experienced much higher variance in business- cycle fl uctuations than oth-
ers (in the core). As a result, the asymmetry between member countries is 
to be found in the variance of the business cycles. This feature is striking in 
 Figure 7.8 , which shows the movements of the business- cycle components in 
the different Eurozone countries. These appear to move together but are of 
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 Figure 7.8:  Business- cycle component of GDP growth. 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
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very different amplitude. Some countries like Ireland and Spain experience 
a very strong boom and later bust, while countries like Belgium, Austria, and 
Germany experience similar cycles but of much less amplitude. 
 In order to obtain a more precise estimate of the asymmetry in the ampli-
tudes of the business cycles, we regressed each country’s domestic cyclical 
component on the Eurozone common cyclical component. The estimated 
slope coeffi cients reveal the extent to which the domestic cycles are smaller or 
lower in amplitude than the common cycle. The estimated slope coeffi cients 
are presented in  Table 7.3 . It is striking to fi nd how different these slope coeffi -
cients are. Germany, Belgium, Austria, and France have slope coeffi cients that 
are signifi cantly lower than 1, suggesting cycles of signifi cantly lower ampli-
tude than the euro- cycle. Conversely, Finland, Spain, and especially Ireland 
and Greece, have slope coeffi cients signifi cantly higher than 1. This suggests 
that these countries experienced much higher amplitudes in their business 
cycles than the common euro- cycle. 
 7.5  What Kind of Flexibility 
 In the previous sections we lumped together labour- market and product 
market fl exibility. This may make sense when discussing the trade- off 
between stabilisation and fl exibility but not when analysing the long- term 
growth potential of countries. Labour- market and product market fl exibility 
 Table 7.3:  Slope of regression 
domestic cycle on euro- cycle 
Slop
Germany 0.21
Belgium 0.48
Austria 0.49
France 0.55
Italy 0.77
Netherlands 0.80
Portugal 1.02
Finland 1.21
Spain 1.22
Ireland 2.07
Greece 2.18
 Source: Own calculations. 
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may have different implications for long- term growth. In order to analyse 
this issue, in  a previous study we performed an econometric analysis of 
the separate effects of labour- market and product market rigidities in the 
OECD countries during the period 1980– 2014. 12  We used standard econo-
metric growth analysis of panel data. The measures of labour- market rigid-
ity were the OECD employment protection index and for product market 
rigidity the OECD product market legislation index. The most striking 
aspect of the results is the fi nding that these measures of the labour and 
product market rigidities do not seem to have any infl uence on the growth 
rate of GDP per capita in OECD countries. Similar results were obtained 
by IMF . 13  
 The conclusion is that employment protection is of no visible importance 
for economic growth may seem surprising. The ‘Brussels– Frankfurt consen-
sus’ has stressed that employment protection has a negative effect on hiring 
and in so doing reduces prospects for growth. This may be true but there is 
another phenomenon that may more than compensate the positive effect of 
fl exibility. In economies where employment protection is weak the incentives 
for fi rms to invest in its labour force is weak. When turnover is high fi rms 
are unlikely to invest in personnel that are likely to quit early. In addition, 
employees that can be fi red quickly have equally weak incentives to invest in 
fi rm- specifi c skills. As a result, labour productivity is negatively affected. More 
generally, the quality of human capital will be low. 
 The same conclusion holds for product market regulations. Product 
market regulations do not seem to matter in the process of economic 
growth. Again this goes against current mainstream thinking, which has 
been much infl uenced by, among others, Aghion et  al., which stresses 
that the model of perfect competition with free entry and price fl exibility 
boosts innovation among fi rms that are close to the technological frontier. 14  
There is an older literature, however, going back to Joseph Schumpeter 
stressing that innovation, investment and growth are better promoted in 
an environment of market imperfections and market power. The empir-
ical evidence suggests that both opposing views may be at work, thereby 
offsetting each other . 
 12   De Grauwe and Ji, n. 8 in this chapter. 
 13   International Monetary Fund,  World Economic Outlook: Uneven Growth – Short- and Long- 
term Factors (International Monetary Fund, 2015), pp.  104– 7 ( chapter  3, Box 3.5 on ‘The 
Effects of Structural Reforms on Total Factor Productivity’). 
 14   P.  Aghion ,  C.  Harris ,  P.  Howitt , and  J.  Vickers , ‘ Competition, Imitation and Growth with Step- 
by- Step Innovation ’ ( 2001 )  68  Review of Economic Studies   467 . 
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 7.6  Implications for the Governance of the Eurozone 
 The fi ndings reported in the previous sections put the need for stabilisation in 
the Eurozone in a new light. We analyse two implications that involve steps 
towards budgetary integration. First, the fi nding of the overwhelming impor-
tance of the cyclical and temporary component of output growth should lead 
to the conclusion that efforts to stabilise the business cycle should be strength-
ened relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms. 
In terms of our theoretical analysis this means that  Figure 7.6 is probably the 
relevant one. Again, this does not mean that fl exibility can be disposed of. 
 7.6.1  Common Unemployment Insurance 
 A second implication of our empirical results relates to the many proposals 
made to create a fi scal space at the Eurozone level in the form of a common 
unemployment insurance system. 15  The proposals for such an insurance sys-
tem have very much been infl uenced by the standard assumption made in the 
OCA- theory that shocks are asymmetric, in other words, that when one coun-
try experiences a recession, and thus increasing unemployment, the other 
country experiences a boom, and declining unemployment. This facilitates 
the workings of the common unemployment insurance system. The booming 
country transfers resources to the country in a recession and thereby smooths 
the business cycles in the two countries. Technically and politically such a 
system encounters relatively few problems. 
 Problems may arise when, as we have found, business cycles are relatively 
well synchronised but of very different amplitudes in the different member 
countries. In that case most countries will tend to experience a recession at 
about the same time; in some countries the recession will be mild but in oth-
ers very intense. This creates both an economic and a political problem. First, 
countries with a mild recession are asked to transfer resources to countries 
experiencing a stronger recession. This tends to reduce the intensity of the 
 15   See, for example, H. Van Rompuy, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, 
Report in Close Collaboration with J.M. Barroso, J.C. Juncker, and M. Draghi (“The Four 
Presidents Report”)’ (2012), available at: ec.europa.eu/ priorities/ sites/ beta- political/ fi les/ 
5- presidents- report_ en.pdf (accessed 20 October 2016); Tommaso Padoa- Schioppa Group, 
‘Completing the Euro: A Road Map towards Fiscal Union in Europe’ (2012), available at: 
 www.notre- europe.eu/ media/ completingtheeuroreportpadoa- schioppagroupnejune2012.
pdf?pdf=ok (accessed 20 October 2016); M. Beblavy, G. Marconi, and I. Maselli, ‘European 
Unemployment Benefi ts Scheme: The Rationale and the Challenges Ahead’ (2015), avail-
able at:  www.ceps.eu/ system/ fi les/ CEPS%20SR%20No%20119%20EUBS_ 0.pdf (accessed 20 
October 2016). 
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recession in the latter country at the expense of making it more intense in the 
former country. It is not clear that this improves welfare. Second, it is likely 
to create important political problems in the former country that is asked to 
transfer resources when the economy is not doing well. Another way to for-
mulate the previous insights is the following. The traditional proposals for a 
Eurozone unemployment insurance mechanism are predicated on the view 
that there is a need to smooth differences in unemployment changes across 
countries. That is, it is assumed that some countries experience increases, 
others declines in unemployment. The insurance mechanism then smooths 
these intercountry differences. We have noted, however, that this is not a typ-
ical Eurozone asymmetry. What we found is that most countries are likely 
to experience a boom and a recession at about the same time, with different 
intensities and amplitudes. There is therefore relatively little need for inter-
country smoothing of business- cycle movements. The more pressing need is 
to smooth volatilities over time. 
 The previous analysis suggests that common unemployment insurance 
schemes should put emphasis on smoothing over time and not so much 
on intercountry smoothing. This can be achieved by allowing the common 
unemployment insurance scheme to accumulate defi cits and surpluses over 
time. The fi scal rule that could be imposed is that the insurance scheme bal-
ances over the business cycle.  Beblavy and Maselli have performed interesting 
simulations of several schemes that impose such a fi scal rule . 16  In general it 
appears from these simulations that such an insurance mechanism can be 
implemented. Such a rule would make it possible to automatically balance 
the need for intercountry and intertemporal smoothing. 
 The previous analysis makes clear, however, that given the importance of 
common business- cycle movements, a common unemployment insurance 
mechanism will need a capacity to issue bonds during recessions when the 
payments made by the insurance scheme will exceed the contributions by 
the Member States. During these periods the defi cits of the scheme will have 
to be fi nanced by the issue of common bonds, which one may want to call 
Eurobonds. Put differently, the common unemployment insurance mecha-
nism will have to work like a common fund that is capable of issuing debt 
during recessions. If this is not allowed, a common unemployment insur-
ance system cannot contribute much to common stabilisation efforts. Thus, 
 16   M. Beblavy and I.  Maselli, ‘An Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro 
Area:  A  Simulation Exercise of Two Options’ (2014), available at:   www.ceps.eu/ system/ 
files/ CEPS%20Special%20Report%20An%20EU%20Unemployment%20Insurance%20
Scheme%20Beblavy%20and%20Masselli.pdf (accessed 20 October 2016). 
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a workable common unemployment benefi t scheme will necessarily imply 
some form of budgetary union. 
 Such a budgetary union can be kept relatively mild by imposing the fi scal 
rule mentioned earlier: that during common booms, the bonds issues during 
the recession are retired, thereby insuring that there is no long- term accumu-
lation of common bonds. Today, this is probably as far as one can go in the 
direction of a budgetary union . 
 7.6.2  National Stabilisation? 
 In  principle, intertemporal smoothing could be done at the national level, by 
allowing the national budgets to do the job. However, the large differences 
in the amplitude of business- cycle movements make such a purely national 
approach problematic, as it leads to large differences in the budget defi cits and 
debt accumulation between countries. These differences quickly spill over 
into fi nancial markets when countries that are hit very hard by a downward 
movement in output are subjected to sudden stops and liquidity crises. 17  This 
is likely to force them to switch off the automatic stabilisers in their national 
budgets. 18  As we argued, this can push countries into a bad equilibrium. Put 
differently, in the absence of a budgetary union, large differences in the ampli-
tude of the business cycles are likely to hit the countries experiencing the more 
severe recession by ‘sudden stops’, that is to say, by large liquidity outfl ows that 
force them to abandon any ambition to stabilise the business- cycle shocks. 
In addition, these liquidity outfl ows are infl ows in some other countries in 
the monetary union, typically those that are least hit by the recession. 19  Their 
economic conditions improve at the expense of the others. The stabilisation of 
common business shocks with different amplitudes at the national level makes 
the system unstable. 
 In this respect, the research of Alcidi and Thirion is relevant. 20  These authors 
fi nd that while the core Eurozone countries have been able to stabilise part 
 17   See P. De Grauwe, ‘The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone’ (2011)  CEPS Working Documents , 
No. 346 . 
 18   P.  De Grauwe and  Y.  Ji , ‘ Self- fulfi lling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test ’ ( 2012 )  34 
 Journal of International Money and Finance   15 . 
 19   This is confi rmed by the empirical work of Furceri and Zdzienicka (D. Furceri and M.A. 
Zdzienicka, ‘The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?’ 
(2013)  IMF Staff Discussion Note , No. 13– 198) and Hoffmann and Nitschka ( M.  Hoffmann 
and  T.  Nitschka , ‘ Securitization of Mortgage Debt, Domestic Lending, and International Risk 
Sharing ’ ( 2012 )  45 Canadian Journal of Economics  493 ) who fi nd that during recessions risk 
sharing through fi nancial markets declines dramatically. 
 20   C. Alcidi and G. Thirion,  Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefi t 
Scheme :  Interim report (CEPS, 2015). 
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(about 50 per cent) of the business- cycle shocks at the national level since 
the eruption of the debt crisis in 2010, the peripheral countries have been 
unable to do so, and also unable to profi t from insurance mechanisms at the 
level of the Eurozone. As a result, most (90 per cent) of the business- cycle 
shocks had to be absorbed by drops in consumption (and therefore in employ-
ment). National stabilisation efforts do not work but introduce an element of 
instability into a monetary union, mainly because they leave the countries 
most hit by the business- cycle shocks unable to stabilise. Thus, when busi-
ness- cycle shocks dominate (as we have shown in the previous section) it will 
be necessary to follow a common approach to the stabilisation of the business 
cycles.  The common unemployment insurance mechanisms discussed in the 
previous section move us in this direction. Whether these schemes are impor-
tant enough to perform a signifi cant stabilising role remains to be seen. The 
common insurance mechanisms now being proposed have a relatively small 
intertemporal smoothing component, amounting to no more than 0.1 to 0.2 
per cent of GDP over the business cycle, certainly insuffi cient to produce a 
signifi cant intertemporal smoothing at the EU - level . 21  
 Thus, in the long run further steps towards a budgetary union will be nec-
essary. By centralising part of the national budgets into a common budget 
managed by a common political authority, the different increases in budget 
defi cits following from a (common) recession translate into a budget defi cit at 
the union level. As a result, the destabilising fl ows of liquidity between coun-
tries disappear, and the common budgetary authority can allow the automatic 
stabilisers in the budget to do their role in smoothing the business cycle. In 
fact, because a common budget also generates implicit intercountry transfers 
the countries with the deepest recession will profi t from the automatic stabi-
lising features of the common budget most. As a result, a common budget 
provided the most effective way to stabilise the business cycle. It is clear, how-
ever, that a budgetary union in which a signifi cant part of national taxation 
and spending is transferred to a European government and parliament is far 
off. For the time being less ambitious efforts, such as the common unemploy-
ment insurance systems, are all that is feasible. They are important though in 
that they make clear the direction the Eurozone institutions will have to take 
in the future . 22  
 21   Beblavy and Maselli, n. 16 in this chapter. 
 22   See also, on this,  F.  Vandenbroucke , ‘ The Case for a European Social Union. From Muddling 
Through to a Sense of Common Purpose ’, in  B.  Marin (ed.),  The Future of Welfare in a Global 
Europe ( Aldershot ,  2015 ) . 
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 7.7  Completing the Monetary Union with Political Union 
 The present institutional setup of the Eurozone is characterised by the fact that 
a number of bureaucratic institutions have acquired signifi cant responsibilities 
without political accountability. Thus, there has been a transfer of sovereignty 
without a concomitant democratic legitimacy. Here we concentrate on the 
European Commission. Elsewhere, we discussed the European Central Bank. 23  
 7.7.1  The European Commission and Political Union 
 The European Commission has seen its responsibilities increase since the 
eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. This has been motivated 
by the desire of the creditor nations to impose budgetary and macroeconomic 
discipline on the debtor nations. As a result, the Stability and Growth Pact 
has been strengthened, and the European Commission has been entrusted 
with the responsibility of monitoring macroeconomic imbalances and to force 
debtor nations to change their macroeconomic policies. 24  The idea that mac-
roeconomic imbalances should be monitored and controlled is a good one. 
The emergence of such imbalances was at the origin of the euro- crisis. Yet the 
way this idea has been implemented is unsustainable in the long run. The new 
responsibilities of the European Commission create a problem of democratic 
legitimacy. The European Commission can now force countries to raise taxes 
and reduce spending without, however, having to bear the political cost of these 
decisions. These costs are borne by national governments. This is a model that 
cannot work. Governments that face the political costs of spending and taxa-
tion will not continue to accept the decisions of unelected offi cials who do not 
face the cost of the decisions they try to impose on these governments. Sooner 
or later governments will go on strike, like the German and French govern-
ments did in 2003– 04. Only the small countries (Portugal, Belgium, Ireland, 
etc.) will have to live with this governance. Large countries will not . 
 7.7.2  Bureaucratic versus Political Integration 
 Increasingly, European integration has taken the form of bureaucratic inte-
gration as a substitute for political integration. This process has started as soon 
as the European political elite became aware that further political integration 
 23   De Grauwe, n. 2 in this chapter. 
 24   In principle, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure should work symmetrically. It is, 
however, very unlikely to work that way. In fact, we see already today that the European 
Commission exerts more pressure on defi cit countries than on surplus countries. 
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would be very diffi cult. This process has become even stronger since the start 
of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. The outcome of this crisis has 
been that the European Commission and the European Central Bank have 
seen their powers increase signifi cantly, without any increase in their account-
ability. More and more these two institutions impose decisions that affect mil-
lions of people’s welfare, but the people who are affected by these decisions 
do not have the democratic means to express their disagreements.  Political 
scientists make a distinction between output and input legitimacy. Output 
legitimacy means that a particular decision is seen to be legitimate if it leads to 
an increase in general welfare. In this view, a government that is technocratic 
can still be legitimate if it is perceived to improve welfare. This view is very 
much infl uenced by the Platonic view of the perfect State. This is a State that 
is run by benevolent philosophers who know better than the population what 
is good for them and act to increase the country’s welfare. Input legitimacy 
means that political decisions, whatever their outcome, must be based on a 
process that involves the population, through elections that allow people to 
sack those who have made bad decisions. 
 Much of the integration process in Europe has been based on the idea of 
output legitimacy. The weak part of that kind of legitimacy becomes visible 
when the population is not convinced that what the philosophers at the top 
have decided, has improved welfare . That is the situation today in Europe. In 
many countries there is a perception that the decisions taken in Brussels and 
Frankfurt have harmed their welfare . 
 7.8  Conclusion 
 Since the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, member countries have been 
pushed towards introducing more fl exibility into labour and product mar-
kets.  This  drive towards structural reforms was very much infl uenced by the 
traditional theory of OCA. This theory stresses that in the face of asymmet-
ric shocks member countries should have a suffi cient degree of labour and 
product market fl exibility to adjust to these shocks. Without such fl exibility 
adjustment will be impossible, thereby undermining the sustainability of the 
monetary union. The underlying assumption of the OCA prescription for 
structural reform is that asymmetric shocks are permanent (such as perma-
nent changes in preferences or productivity shocks). When the shocks are 
temporary it does not follow that more fl exibility is the answer . More specifi -
cally, when the shocks are the result of unsynchronised business- cycle move-
ments, the way to deal with them is by stabilisation efforts . In this chapter we 
have provided empirical evidence to suggest that the most signifi cant shocks 
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in the Eurozone have been the result of boom and bust, driven by waves of 
optimism and pessimism. These business- cycle movements have been rela-
tively well- synchronised.  What was not synchronised was the amplitude of 
these business- cycle movements, where some countries experienced much 
greater amplitude in business cycles than others. In principle, these business- 
cycle movements could be stabilised at the national level without the need 
for budgetary union. However, as the amplitude of these movements is so 
different, countries experiencing the deepest recession are likely to be hit by 
‘sudden stops’, meaning liquidity outfl ows triggered by fear and panic, which 
forces them to switch off the automatic stabilisers in the budget, preventing 
them from conducting any stabilisation. We argued that the best possible way 
to deal with the business- cycle movements whose amplitude is unsynchro-
nised is by introducing a budgetary union. By centralising part of the national 
budgets into a common budget managed by a common political authority, 
the various increases in budget defi cits following from a (common) recession 
translate into a budget defi cit at the union level. As a result, the destabilising 
fl ows of liquidity between countries during the recession disappear, and the 
common budgetary authority can allow the automatic stabiliser in the com-
mon budget to perform its role in smoothing the business cycle. It is highly 
unlikely that the governance of the Eurozone will move in the direction of cre-
ating institutions capable of providing the necessary stabilisation of booms and 
busts that national governments are no longer able to provide. The willingness 
to move in this direction is minimal. This has much to do with the absence 
of a ‘deep variable’ in the monetary union. This deep variable is the sense of 
belonging to the same (European) nation and that creates the political basis 
for organising transfers between countries. The absence of this deep variable 
makes it inevitable that one looks for schemes that introduce some stabilisa-
tion at the Eurozone level without going all the way towards budgetary union . 
 We discussed common unemployment insurance schemes that are now 
being proposed and stressed that these have to put more emphasis on inter-
temporal insurance and less on intercountry insurance. This also implies that 
they should have the capacity to issue bonds during recessions, and to do the 
opposite during an economic boom, making sure that over the business cycle 
there would be no net issue of common bonds. 
 The unwillingness to create a political union has also led to a continuing 
temptation to resort to technical solutions to the problem. Thus, there has 
been a proliferation of technical schemes to introduce Eurobonds. 25  We have 
 25   See J. Delpla and J. Von Weizsäcker, ‘The Blue Bond Proposal’ (2010) 2010 Bruegel Policy 
Brief 1;  P.  De Grauwe and  W.  Moesen , ‘ Gains for All:  A  Proposal for a Common Euro 
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108235174.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UCL, Institute of Education, on 12 Mar 2019 at 15:22:46, subject to the Cambridge Core
Booms, Busts and the Governance of the Eurozone 183
183
discussed a common unemployment insurance mechanism in this chapter. 
They are necessary to indicate the direction in which the Eurozone will have 
to move. There is a danger, however, that they create a fi ction that technical 
solutions (and therefore also bureaucratic integration) can be a substitute for 
political unifi cation. As a result, they comfort policy- makers in their decision 
to set aside all further attempts towards a political union. 
 7.9  Appendix 
 As suggested in the main text, the choice of the smoothing parameter (lamda) 
in the Hodrick- Prescott (HP) fi lter has a signifi cant infl uence on the estimate 
of the cyclical and permanent components of GDP- growth. In this appendix 
we illustrate this by comparing estimates, using a high and a low lamda. The 
high lamda is the same as the one used in the text and was set equal to 1200; 
the low lamda was set equal to 100. We compare the results in  Figure 7.9 . It 
is immediately evident that in the low lamda estimates the long- term growth 
line follows the observed output growth line more closely. As a result, the 
cyclical component is on average smaller than in the high lamda case. This is 
made clear in  Table 7.4 , which shows the mean absolute changes in the trend 
and cyclical components. Even in the case of a low lamda we fi nd that the 
peripheral countries have been subjected to larger cyclical than permanent 
movements in output. 
 Table 7.5 presents the correlation coeffi cients of the cyclical components 
of GDP growth for low lamda. It should be compared with  Table 7.2 in the 
text. We observe that in the low lamda estimates the correlation coeffi cients 
are of a similar order of magnitude as in the high lamda case. Thus, one of 
our main conclusions, that business cycles have been highly correlated, is 
maintained. This is also made clear in  Figures 7.10 and  7.11 that show the 
evolution of the business- cycle component in the two estimates. Obviously, 
in the low lamda estimate the business- cycle components are generally 
lower than in the high lamda estimate. In both cases, though, we observe 
similarly correlated booms and busts in the Eurozone. And, as  Figure 7.12 
indicates, the divergence in the amplitude of the business cycles across 
countries tends to increase during the boom years prior to the crisis. This 
Bond ’ ( 2009 )  44  Intereconomics  132 ;  J.  Von Hagen and  G.W.  Hammond ‘ Regional Insurance 
against Asymmetric Shocks:  An Empirical Study for the European Community ’ ( 1998 )  66 
 The Manchester School  331 ;  J.  Drèze ,  A.  Durré , and  J.  Carpantier , ‘ Fiscal Integration and 
Growth Stimulation in Europe ’ ( 2012 )  80  Recherches économiques de Louvain  5 ;  H.  Enderlein , 
 L.  Guttenberg , and  J.  Spiess ,  Blueprint for a Cyclical Shock Insurance in the Euro Area, Studies 
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 Figure 7.9:  Cyclical and trend components in GDP growth (1999– 2014), side- 
by- side comparison high lamda (HL) (Figure 7.7) and low lamda (LL): (a) Austria 
(HL); (b)  Austria (LL); (c)  Belgium (HL); (d)  Belgium (LL); (e)  Finland 
(HL); (f)  Finland (LL); (g)  France (HL); (h)  France (LL); (i)  Germany (HL); 
(j) Germany (LL); (k) Greece (HL); (l) Greece (LL); (m) Ireland (HL); (n) Ireland 
(LL); (o) Italy (HL); (p) Italy (LL); (q) Netherlands (HL); (r) Netherlands (LL); 
(s) Portugal (HL); (t) Portugal (LL); (u) Spain (HL); (v) Spain (LL). 
 Sources: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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is also what we found using estimates with a high lamda. Thus, one of our 
major empirical conclusions still stands, even when one uses a low lamda. 
This is that the asymmetry in the business cycles of the Eurozone countries 
is to be found in the divergence in the amplitude of the business cycle. The 
business cycles themselves tended to be highly correlated. There is reason 
to believe that the low lamda estimates bias the business- cycle components 
downwards and thus the long- term growth component upwards (in absolute 
value). This is made clear from Tables 7.6, which compares the estimates of 
long- term growth in 1995 and 2014 in the two lamda scenarios. We fi nd that 
in the low lamda estimates the decline in long- term growth in a number of 
periphery countries is implausibly high. In the cases of Ireland and Greece 
long- term growth declines by more than 7 percentage points. (The corre-
sponding declines in the high lamda case is 2 per cent.) 
 Table 7.4:  Mean (absolute) trend growth and mean (absolute) business- cycle 
change in GDP (as a percentage) during 1999– 2014, side- by- side comparison low 
lamda and high lamda ( Table 7.1 ) 
 Low lamda  High lamda  
Mean 
cycle
Mean 
trend
Ratio Mean 
cycle
Mean 
trend
Ratio
Belgium 0.97 1.47 0.66 Austria 1.79% 1.77% 1.01
Austria 1.18% 1.58 0.75 Belgium 1.72% 1.67% 1.03
Spain 1.69 2.22 0.76 Germany 1.55% 1.23% 1.26
France 1.04 1.27 0.82 France 2.15% 1.49% 1.44
Portugal 1.63 1.40 1.16 Netherlands 2.66% 1.66% 1.60
Netherlands 1.61 1.33 1.21 Finland 4.35% 2.02% 2.15
Germany 1.49 1.18 1.27 Spain 4.58% 2.07% 2.21
Ireland 3.26 2.48 1.31 Ireland 8.01% 3.35% 2.39
Finland 2.08 1.53 1.36 Portugal 3.67% 0.81% 4.53
Italy 1.37 0.96 1.42 Italy 2.86% 0.41% 7.05
Greece 4.50 2.85 1.58 Greece 9.09% 0.90% 10.11
 Notes : see  Table 7.1 . 
 Source: Computations based on data from Eurostat. 
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 Figure 7.10:  Business- cycle component of GDP growth, low lamda. 
 Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat. 
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 Table 7.5:  Correlation coeffi cients of cyclical components of GDP growth, low lamda 
 Aus Bel Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Net Por
Austria
Belgium 0.9
Finland 0.9 0.9
France 0.9 0.9 0.9
Germany 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8
Greece 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 − 0.0
Ireland 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.4
Italy 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7
Netherlands 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.7
Portugal 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8
Spain 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6
 Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat. 
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 Figure 7.11:  Business- cycle component of GDP growth, high lamda. 
 Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat ( Figure 7.8 ). 
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 Figure 7.12:  Standard deviation cyclical component, low lamda. 
 Table 7.6:  Estimates of long- term growth in 1995 and 2014 
 Low lamda  High lamda 
Tre Tre Cha Tre Tre014 Cha
Austria 2.58 1.02 − 1.56 Austria 2.0 1.6 − 0.
Belgium 2.49 0.90 − 1.59 Belgium 1.9 1.5 − 0.
Finland 4.20 0.09 − 4.11 Finland 2.7 1.6 − 1.
France 2.53 0.69 − 1.84 France 1.8 1.3 − 0.
Germany 1.55 1.11 − 0.43 Germany 1.3 1.2 − 0.
Greece 4.12 − 3.37 − 7.49 Greece 2.1 0.1 − 2.
Ireland 7.66 0.41 − 7.26 Ireland 4.7 2.7 − 2.
Italy 1.71 − 0.86 − 2.57 Italy 0.8 0.1 − 0.
Netherlands 3.27 0.45 − 2.83 Netherlands 2.1 1.4 − 0.
Portugal 2.98 − 0.87 − 3.85 Portugal 1.5 0.4 − 1.
Spain 3.99 − 0.14 − 4.13 Spain 2.8 1.6 − 1.
 Source:  De Grauwe and Ji, n9 above. 
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